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Abstract 
This paper examines the Law Commission’s proposals to use a right of reply as a 
remedy within a new regime to combat harmful digital communications on the 
Internet in its Ministerial Briefing Paper, Harmful Digital Communications: The 
Adequacy of Current Sanctions and Remedies. It seeks to determine whether a right 
of reply is a suitable tool to use in an online context against ordinary citizens, when it 
has typically been an offline remedy for use against the media. It also considers the 
best form for a right of reply under this new regulatory regime, in order for it to 
constitute a proportional limit on a defendant’s right to freedom of expression. It 
concludes that a right of reply could be a suitable remedy under the regime, and it 
could constitute a proportional limit on a defendant’s freedom of expression, but a 
Court should carefully balance the harms a right of reply might pose against the 
values of free speech implicated in each circumstance, on a case-by-case basis, in 
order to ensure the limitations a right of reply might pose on freedom of expression 
are always proportional and justified. 
 
Word length 
The text of this paper (excluding abstract, table of contents, footnotes and 
bibliography) comprises approximately 14, 994 words. 
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I Introduction 
 
In response to growing concern over the use of new technologies to cause harm, last 
year the Law Commission (“the Commission”) proposed a number of 
recommendations to regulate online conduct in its Ministerial Briefing Paper, 
Harmful Digital Communications: The Adequacy of Current Sanctions and 
Remedies.1 There is concern that the Internet has become something akin to “a vast 
unsupervised playground” where people are free to harass and defame others with 
little to no repercussions.2 The Commission’s paper considered how to adapt New 
Zealand’s law to the digital age, make the law easier for the ordinary citizen to 
understand, and provide meaningful remedies for significant harm caused by digital 
communications.3 Earlier this year, Cabinet’s Social Policy Committee endorsed most 
of the Commission’s proposals.4 Many of the proposals require legislative reform in 
order to be implemented, and so a Bill is intended to be passed by the end of 2013.5 
The Commission has proposed that a right of reply should be available to a 
complainant to remedy a harmful digital communication.6 However, neither the 
Commission nor the Social Policy Committee have provided any guidance as to the 
scope or availability of this remedy, although it has been noted that a Court should 
give regard to freedom of expression when considering remedies.7 This paper 
addresses when and how a right of reply should be used under this new regime in 
order for it to constitute a justified limitation on a defendant’s right to freedom of 
expression. 
 
There is no right of reply in New Zealand’s current law that a right of reply under this 
new regime can model itself on, although the Broadcasting Standards Authority does 
have the ability to grant a similar remedy; it can order the publication of a general 
                                                        
1 Law Commission Harmful Digital Communications: The Adequacy of Current Sanctions and 
Remedies (NZLC Ministerial Briefing Paper, 2012). 
2 At 5. 
3 At 6. 
4 Cabinet Social Policy Committee Harmful Digital Communications: Cabinet Social Policy Cabinet 
Social Policy Committee <http://www.justice.govt.nz/publications/global-publications/h/harmful-
digital-communications-cabinet-social-policy-Cabinet Social Policy Committee/publication> 
5 At [111]. 
6 Law Commission , above n 1, at [5.66]. 
7 At [5.80]. 
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statement which could include a “reply” from a complainant.8 Although there is a 
“right of reply” provision in the Defamation Act 1992,9 it is seen as dissatisfactory 
and ineffective;10 it does not prevent a claimant from instigating defamation 
proceedings and a defendant can easily refuse to publish the reply,11 so it is seldom 
used, and consequently of little help to this paper. Instead, this paper draws 
inspiration from other jurisdictions to consider what form a right of reply should take 
under this new regime in order to impose a reasonable and demonstrably justified 
limit on a defendant’s freedom of expression. 
 
A right of reply traditionally refers to the right of a citizen to have a newspaper 
publish his side of the story when that newspaper has published a defamatory 
statement about them,12 or affected their right to personality.13 The purpose of 
defamation laws have typically been to help protect a claimant’s reputation.14 Since 
New Zealand has no general right to personality,15 but has adopted defamation laws, 
this paper proceeds on the assumption that a right of reply under the new regime is 
also intended to protect reputation in a similar way to defamation law.  
 
Part II of this paper gives a brief outline of the Commission’s recommendations for 
this new regime for regulating online conduct before addressing the following issues. 
Since a right of reply has traditionally been used against the media in an offline 
context, Part III explains why a right of reply is a suitable remedy in an online context, 
while Part IV examines why it should be made available against ordinary citizens and 
not just against media defendants. Part V details how a right of reply might breach a 
defendant’s right to freedom of expression, whilst Part VI moves on to consider when 
                                                        
8 Broadcasting Act 1989, s 13(1). 
9 Section 25. 
10 Tracey Walker Reputation Matters: A Practical Legal Guide to Managing Reputational Risk (CCH 
New Zealand Limited, Auckland, 2012) at 33. 
11 Section 25. 
12 Richard C Donnelly “A Right of Reply: An Alternative to an Action for Libel” (1948) 34 Va Law 
Rev 867 at 884-885. 
13 Georgios Gounalakis Privacy and the Media: A Comparative Perspective (Verlag CH Beck, 
Munchen, 2000) at 57-69. See also: Kyu Ho Youm “The Right of Reply and Freedom of the Press: An 
International and Comparative Perspective” (2008) 76 Geo Wash L Rev 1017 at 1042. 
14 Lawrence McNamara Defamation and Reputation (Oxford University Press, New York, 2007), at 
92. See also: Lange v Atkinson and Australian Consolidated Press NZ Ltd [1997] 2 NZLR 22 (HC) at 
30 and Television New Zealand Ltd v Quinn [1996] 3 NZLR 24 (CA) at 37-38. 
15 Huw Beverley-Smith, Ansgar Ohly and Agnes Lucas-Schloetter Privacy, Property and Personality: 
Civil Law Perspectives on Commercial Appropriation (Cambridge University Press, New York, 2005) 
at 207 
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and how a right of reply should be used in order for this limit to be demonstrably 
justified according to section 5 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act (NZBORA). 
This paper ultimately concludes that a right of reply could constitute a justified 
limitation on free speech, but this will essentially depend on the nature of the original 
statement and how the benefits of a right of reply weigh up against the limits imposed 
on the free speech values implicated in each particular case. Whether or not a right of 
reply is overall a proportionate and justified infringement of free speech should 
therefore be determined by the courts on a case by case basis. 
  
II The Law Commission’s Proposals (as adopted by Cabinet’s Social 
Policy Committee) 
 
The Commission has proposed the adoption of statutory principles derived from New 
Zealand law, the breach of which would entitle a person to seek redress.16 The 
principles are as follows:17 
 
There should be no [digital] communications which cause significant emotional 
distress to an individual because they:  
 
1. Disclose sensitive personal facts about individuals.  
2. Are threatening, intimidating or menacing. 
3. Are grossly offensive.  
4. Are indecent or obscene.  
5. Are part of a pattern of conduct which constitutes harassment.  
6. Make false allegations.  
7. Contain matter which is published in breach of confidence.  
8. Incite others to send messages to a person with the intention of causing that 
person harm.  
9. Incite or encourage another to commit suicide.  
10. Denigrate a person by reason of that person’s colour; race; ethnic or national 
origins; religion; ethical belief; gender; sexual orientation or disability.  
 
The principles are derived from several aspects of New Zealand domestic law and are 
in a sense “stripped down law”.18 Once a principle has been breached, a claimant’s 
                                                        
16 Law Commission, above n 1, at [5.66]. 
17 At [5.66]. 
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first point of call would be an agency approved by the Ministry (“approved 
agency”).19 The approved agency would receive initial complaints about digital 
communications, investigate them and liase with website hosts and Internet Service 
Providers (ISPs) to negotiate causes of action to deal with the harm without the need 
for court action.20  
 
If the approved agency does not provide the claimant with adequate redress, and the 
complaint is sufficiently serious, the matter can be dealt with by the District Court.21 
The Commission originally proposed a new tribunal to deal with such complaints, but 
this suggestion was rejected by the Social Policy Committee.22 The Commission 
suggested a number of remedies be available to the tribunal that the Committee 
decided should instead be available to the District Court.23 These include the power to 
issue:24 
 
1. An order to takedown material – issued against either the perpetrator or the ISP.  
2. An order that the defendant cease the conduct in question.  
3. An order not to encourage others to engage in similar communications with the 
complainant.  
4. A direction that the order may apply to other persons if there is evidence that they 
have been encouraged to engage in harmful communications.  
5. A declaration that the communication breaches the statutory principles.  
6. An order requiring publication of a correction.  
7. An order that a right of reply to be given to the complainant.  
8. An order requiring publication of an apology.  
9. An order that the identity of an anonymous communication be released. 
10. An order that the names of any parties be suppressed.  
 
The Commission intends to enable these orders to be imposed against the original 
communicator of the harmful statement, or website hosts, ISPs and Internet 
intermediaries.25 This paper focusses on the availability of a right of reply against the 
                                                                                                                                                              
18 Law Commission, above n 1, at [5.63]. 
19 At [5.45]. 
20 Cabinet Social Policy Committee, above n 4, at  [40.1]-[40.9]. 
21 At [5]. 
22 At [45]-[49]. 
23 At [55]. 
24 At [55.1]-[55.10]. 
25 Law Commission, above n 1, at [5.87]. 
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original communicator, as issues regarding ISP and hosting liabilities are beyond the 
scope of this paper.  
 
In a separate report published this year, The News Media Meets New Media: Rights, 
Responsibilities and Regulation in the Digital Age, the Commission proposed a new 
independent media standards authority to replace the Press Council, the Broadcasting 
Standards Authority and the Online Standards Authority.26 However, these proposals 
have been rejected by the government.27 This new body was to be called the New 
Media Standards Authority (NMSA).28 The goal of the NMSA was to apply 
consistent reporting standards across print, broadcasting and online media.29 The 
NMSA was to provide quick remedies for breaches of standards by the media, and 
would also have the power to grant an order for a right of reply.30 In order to be a 
member of the NMSA, a person would have had to regularly publish information, a 
significant amount of which involves the generation and dissemination of news to a 
public audience, and choose to be held accountable to the NMSA.31 The Commission 
noted that though many media-like individuals may choose not to be held accountable 
NMSA, they would still be covered by the recommendations outlined in the earlier 
Ministerial Briefing Paper for the regulation of online conduct.32 Thus, it would 
appear that the Commission originally envisaged a right of reply be made available 
against both the “media” and the ordinary citizen using the Internet. This paper 
focuses on the Commission’s proposals for regulating online conduct of ordinary 
citizens, because these proposals have not been rejected, and it is important to 
consider whether a right of reply is a suitable remedy against an ordinary citizen, as 
traditionally a right of reply has only been available against the media.33  
 
                                                        
26 Law Commission The News Media Meets ‘New Media’: Rights, Responsibilities and Regulation in 
the Digital Age (NZLC R128, 2013) at 10. 
27 Judith Collins and Craig Foss “Government responds to news media report” (12 September 2013) 
beehive.govt.nz <http://beehive.govt.nz/release/government-responds-news-media-
report?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+beehive-govt-
nz%2Fportfolio%2Fjustice+%28Justice+-+beehive.govt.nz%29>  
28 Law Commission, above n 26, at 11. 
29 At 5. 
30 At 12. 
31 At 12. 
32 At 14. 
33 Donnelly, above n 12, at 884-885. 
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III The Nature of the Internet: Is a Right of Reply is Suitable in an Online 
Context? 
A Borderlessness and Potential Audience Sizes 
 
The Internet allows for broad, “borderless” communications; it knows no 
geographical boundaries.34 Moreover, online communications, such as blogs and 
forums, allow for one-to-many publications; we are no longer limited to one-to-one 
publications, such as fax and email.35 The combination of “borderlessness” and the 
capacity to allow one-to-many communications makes online communications 
virtually uncontrollable,36 as there is often no way to restrict the audience size and 
readership. It is thus difficult to conceive how many readers a publication will 
actually generate. As of October 2011, there were approximately 3.6 million Internet 
connections in New Zealand;37 most of the population can now boast access to the 
Internet. Since the Internet is now widely used, the potential audience size can be 
immeasurable in comparison to how many might read similar article in a newspaper.38 
The potential damage of statements on the Internet is a lot higher than offline 
statements, giving greater urgency to the need of a remedy. 
B The “Streisand Effect” and the Ease of Redistribution 
 
Things on the Internet happen quickly, and in unpredictable ways;39 the viral nature of 
the Internet can exacerbate the harms of an original defamatory statement by 
increasing the number of potential readers through redistribution.40 Seeking the 
removal of something can often lead to further publicity, adding fuel to the fire.41 This 
is often referred to as the “Streisand Effect”, after Barbara Streisand brought a lawsuit 
against a photographer to get a photo of the front of her house taken off his website.42 
                                                        
34 Dan Jerker B Svantesson Private International Law and The Internet (Kluwer Law International BV, 
The Netherlands, 2007) at 34-35. 
35 At 34. 
36 Svantesson, above n 34, at 35. 
37 Law Commission The News Media Meets ‘New Media’: Rights, Responsibilities and Regulation in 
the Digital Age (NZLC IP27, 2011) at 1.8. 
38 Svantesson, above n 34, 36-37. 
39 Mike Wagner “Privacy and Reputaiton in the Internet Age” (2013) 71 Advocate at 347 at 351. 
40 Law Commission, above n 1, at [2.42]. 
41 Wagner, above n 39, at 351. 
42 At 355. 
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The lawsuit generated publicity, and the photo started getting copied to other 
webpages, making its removal from the web pretty much impossible.43 When people 
are told they should not see something, this often makes them want to see it more.44 
There is a culture of anti-censorship on the Internet, particularly among younger 
users,45 and when people feel there is a danger of something being censored, or 
restricted, many feel obliged to personally make sure the information remains 
available.46 Redistribution is very easy online, once a person possesses a file, the 
information can be quickly copied at little or no cost to the redistributors.47 A right of 
reply may result in less uproar and less publicity or dissemination of an offending 
statement than outright censorship or restriction. 
C The Permanent Nature of Online Information 
 
Search engines can further expose statements that at first had very limited exposure 
when originally posted.48 The permanent nature of digital information can lead to the 
re-victimisation of a person long after an original statement was made.49 For example, 
employers may do a quick Google search of a prospective employee, unearthing 
statements made about them years ago, and this could result in a decision not to hire 
that person.50 In an online context, today’s news is not necessarily tomorrow’s fish 
and chip wrapper. Rightly or wrongly, the Internet is making it harder for people to 
escape their past. A right of reply can ensure that, should someone conduct an Internet 
search on an individual years after a damaging statement was made about them, that 
statement will be put into context or at least balanced out by the individual’s side of 
the story. 
                                                        
43 Wagner, above n 39, at 355. 
44 Jessica Medberry “Censorship and Adolescent Literature” (Senior Honors Thesis, Colorado State 
University, 15 December 2009) at 36 and 49-50. 
45 Ruth Rettie “Net Generation Culture” (2002) 3 JECR 254 at 257. See also: Daniel W Drezner “The 
Global Governance of the Internet: Bringing the State Back In” (2004) 119 Polit Sci Q 477 at 488. 
46 Eduard Kovaks “Anonymous Hackers Plan Anti-Facebook Censorship Protest for April 6” (26 
March 2013) Softpedia <http://news.softpedia.com/news/Anonymous-Hackers-Plan-Anti-Facebook-
Censorship-Protest-for-April-6-340389.shtml>  
See also: Emma Woolacott “As Pirate Bay Launches Anti-Censorship Browser, Has It Lost Its Way?” 
(12 August 2013) Forbes <http://www.forbes.com/sites/emmawoollacott/2013/08/12/as-pirate-bay-
launches-anti-censorship-browser-has-it-lost-its-way/> 
47 Svantesson, above n 34, at 36. 
48 Law Commission, above n 1, at [3.70] and [3.87]. 
49 At [2.42]. 
50 Erik P Lewis, “Unmasking ‘Anon12345’: applying an appropriate standard when private citizens 
seek the identity of anonymous internet defamation defendants” (2009) 2009 U Ill L Rev 947 at 948. 
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D A “Built in” Right of Reply 
 
The Internet has given new meaning to “freedom of expression” by allowing the 
ordinary citizen to “seek, receive and impart information” in unprecedented ways.51 
Anyone can publish anything on the Internet, often anonymously.52 You no longer 
need a lot of technical knowledge or financial capabilities to publish information to a 
wide audience.53 The public have been given the tools to edit and publish whatever 
they like on the Web.54  Some commentators argue that this means it is unnecessary 
and potentially damaging to subject the “vibrant discussion medium” that is the 
Internet, to “a bureaucratic model of statement and counterstatement” that is a right of 
reply.55 Because virtually anyone can now publish anything they want on the Internet, 
there are some people of the view that this means a right of reply is therefore 
unnecessary in the context of the Internet.56 In other words, some commentators 
believe that there is no reason to allow the state to force a publisher to publish a reply 
when a complainant could publish their own reply somewhere else on the Web. 
 
On the other hand, other commentators are of the view that, “The right of reply is a 
particularly appropriate remedy in the online environment because it allows for an 
instant response to contested information and it is technically easy to attach the replies 
from the persons affected.“57 The right of reply is already encoded within the 
framework of the unregulated Internet; it essentially has a “built in right of reply”.58 
This would make a right of reply very simple to use, and there are virtually no 
publishing costs.  
 
                                                        
51 Law Commission, above n 26, at [1.3].  
52 Wagner, above n 39, at 350. 
53 Svantesson, above n 34, at 35. 
54 Law Commission, above n 1, at [3.19]. 
55 Graham J H Smith and Bird and Bird Internet Law and Regulaton (4th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, 
London, 2007) at 345. 
56 At 345-346. 
57 Proposal for a Recommendation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of 
minors and human dignity and on the right of reply in relation to the competitiveness of the European 
audiovisual and online information services industry, 7064/06  (March 2006) at 13 
58 Judit Bayer “Liability of ISPs for Third Party Content” (Senior Research Fellow Paper, Victoria 
University of Wellington, 2006) at 22. 
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There is also some doubt as to whether the Internet truly does level the playing field 
between the average citizen and the mass media.59 Richard McChesney argues that, 
while the Internet is revolutionary, it has not revolutionised power structures.60 Indeed, 
a reader will probably be more inclined to believe what has been posted on a news 
website, rather than a response from an individual blogger, and very few individuals 
can direct as much viewer traffic to their sites as corporations can.61 Moreover, a 
person who has been personally targeted by a blog post may be able to post his own 
response in a comment on the post, but “a single correcting comment embedded in a 
long tail of abusive commentary may not have much effect.”62 Therefore, in some 
cases, a self-administered reply to a damaging statement may not effectively negate 
the harm of the original statement. A self-administered reply may end up buried under 
thousands of defamatory comments, or perhaps not taken seriously in the face of the 
authority of the original speaker. In such cases, a Court may need to step in to make 
sure that a reply negates the harm of the statement. The Commission states in its 
Ministerial Briefing Paper that where self-regulatory systems and tools on the Internet 
are unavailable or ineffective, then a person who has suffered serious harm should 
have access to redress.63 This suggests that a court sanctioned right of reply should 
only be available where a person was unable to post their own adequate reply to the 
defamatory statement.  
E Conclusion 
 
Due to the fact that a publication can reach a much larger audience, both because of 
the nature of the Internet and the ease of redistribution, the potential for damage to 
reputation is much greater online than offline. The permanent nature of online 
information means that harm is more likely to keep reoccurring. The anti-censorship 
sentiments and the ease of publication on the Internet mean that a right of reply is a 
more suitable remedy than a takedown. The fact that anyone can publish almost 
anything they want on the Internet does not mean that a court-ordered reply is 
                                                        
59 Jerome A Barron “Rights of Access and Reply to the Media in the United States Today” (2003) 25 
Comm & L 1 at 11. 
60 Richard McChesney Rich Media, Poor Democracy: Communications Politics in Dubious Times 
(University of Illinois Press, Illinois, 1999) at 182-183. 
61 Svantesson, above n 34, at 36. 
62 Law Commission, above n 1, at [3.68]. 
63 At [1.39]. 
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unnecessary due to the power imbalances that exist in online communities. Therefore, 
this paper proceeds on the assumption that a right of reply is a suitable remedy in an 
online context. 
 
IV  Should a Right of Reply Extend Beyond the Media to Ordinary 
Citizens? 
 
The concept of a right of reply was devised at a time when publication rights were at 
the hands of a powerful few, whereas now on the Internet, anyone can be a 
publisher.64 By drawing a distinction between regimes for the “new media” and the 
ordinary citizen and then allowing a right of reply to be used under both regimes, the 
Commission perhaps did not intend for the right of reply to extend solely to the media. 
However, given the lack of direction from the Commission with regards to remedies 
under the new regime, the courts might nevertheless decide that a right of reply is 
better suited to “media-like” defendants. 
 
At the European Union level, the European Parliament has adopted a recommendation 
including the right of reply in relation to European audiovisual and online information 
services, but this right is only enforceable against defendants considered to be a part 
of the “media”. 65 The question is whether this new regime should follow suit and 
only allow a right of reply in cases where the defendant is a member of the media. 
The issue then becomes, “what constitutes the media in an online environment?” Does 
an individual blogger count alongside a newspaper’s website?  
 
The distinction between the media and the ordinary citizen has become blurred. The 
mainstream media has begun to harness the power of online social media by using 
user-generated content to distribute and promote their own content.66 As a result, 
there has been a convergence between the mainstream media and the “new media” 
made up of ordinary citizens.67 Mainstream news webpages get a hold of breaking 
news stories from individual bloggers, and source commentary from Facebook pages 
                                                        
64 Smith and Bird and Bird, above n 55, at 345-346. 
65 EDRI-gram French Draft Decree Regarding The Right To Reply On The Internet 
(28 March 2007) EDRI-gram < http://www.edri.org/edrigram/number5.6/right-to-reply-france> 
66 Law Commission, above n 26, at [1.4]. 
67 Law Commission, above n 26, at [1.5]. 
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and Twitter accounts.68 The Council of Europe’s 2004 Recommendation pertaining to 
rights of reply on the Internet only allows replies to the media, or any dissemination 
of “edited information”.69 There is some ambiguity as to what “edited” means. For 
example, whether it means edited by someone other than the author.70 In which case, 
should a right of reply extend to the ordinary blogger or moderated discussion 
forums?71 “Edited information” is a broad term that could potentially cover a lot more 
than what is traditionally considered the “media”, so although the Council of Europe 
has chosen to confine a right of reply to the media, practically it may be more broadly 
applicable than that. 
 
According to the Commission, to be a part of the “media”, a person should regularly 
publish information, a significant amount of which involves the generation and 
dissemination of news to a public audience, and choose to define themselves as the 
“media” by being held accountable to an authority that regulates the media.72 The 
distinction between the media and the ordinary citizen could therefore be the 
regularity of publication and the nature of the information being published. However, 
this definition can extend to ordinary citizens that blog or comment on the news, and 
would not traditionally be considered a part of the media. The only real defining 
feature of the Commission’s test is the voluntary association with a regulatory body, 
which is not currently possible under New Zealand law given the government’s 
refusal to establish the NMSA. 
 
A right of reply traditionally only applied to the media to address the power 
imbalances between the media and the ordinary citizen.73 One does not need to fall 
under the above definition of the “media” to pose a power imbalance on the Internet; 
just because a person does not regularly post about the news does not mean that 
blogger has no influence in online communities or generates less readership. For 
example, a regularly frequented forum filled with user-generated content could, in 
                                                        
68 At [1.5]. 
69 Smith and Bird and Bird, above n 55, at 345. 
70 At 345. 
71 At 345-346. 
72 Law Commission, above n 26, at 12. 
73 Donnelly, above n 12, at 884. See also: Susana N Vittadini Andres “First Amendment influence in 
argentine republic law and jurisprudence” (1999) 4 Comm L & Pol’y 149 at 170. See also Jerome A 
Barron “Access to the Media – A Contemporary Appraisal” (2006) 35 Hofstra L Rev 937 at 942 and 
945.  
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some cases, be considered a sort of community.  A particularly well-respected 
individual might post about another user in a way that that harms their reputation. 
Affected users may find it difficult to defend themselves on the forum with their own 
comments, as other readers are probably more likely to trust the writer that has 
generated their respect, and a reply may end up buried amongst other abusive 
comments. The point is power imbalances still exist online out of a traditional media 
context.  
 
This paper submits that it will be acceptable to order a right of reply even if the 
defendant is not a member of what is considered to be the “media”, as there is no 
longer a clear distinction between who belongs to the media and who does not; the 
distinctions provided by the Commission and the Council of Europe are too arbitrary.  
 
V  How a Right of Reply Infringes Freedom of Expression 
 
According to section 14 of the NZBORA, “Everyone has the right to freedom of 
expression, including the freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and 
opinions of any kind in any form.” All pieces of legislation are to be interpreted as 
consistently with the NZBORA as possible,74 but limits on rights are permissible so 
long as they are demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.75 One should 
take a purposive approach to interpreting rights, taking into account the values that 
underlie them, before moving on to consider whether they have been limited and 
whether the justifications for limiting them are demonstrably justified.76  
 
The New Zealand Court of Appeal has, in Moonen v Film and Literature Board of 
Review, defined freedom of expression as, “as wide as the human imagination”.77 An 
                                                        
74 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 6. 
75 Section 5. 
76 Ministry of Transport v Noort [1992] 3 NZLR 260 (CA) at 279 per Richardson J. See also: Claudia 
Geiringer and Steven Price “Moving From Self-Justification to Demonstrable Justification – the Bill of 
Rights and the Broadcasting Standards Authority” in Jeremy Finn and Steven Todd (eds) Law, Liberty, 
Legislation: Essays in Honour of John Butler QC  (LexisNexis NZ, Wellington, 2008) at 320. See also: 
Paul Rishworth “How to Interpret and Apply the Bill of Rights” (paper presented to the New Zealand 
Law Society The Bill of Rights – Getting the Basics Right Seminar, November 2001) at 7-11. 
77 Moonen v Film and Literature Board of Review [2000] 2 NZLR 9 (CA) at [19] per Tipping J.   
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‘expression’ can be “anything attempting to convey some view or purpose”.78 The 
Canadian Supreme Court has also held that:79  
 
There is no denying that freedom of expression necessarily entails the right to say 
nothing or the right not to say certain things. Silence is in itself a form of expression 
which in some circumstances can express something more clearly than words could do. 
 
In West Virginia State Board of Education v Barnette (Barnette),80 the United States 
(US) Supreme Court held that forcing students to recite the Pledge of Allegiance was 
a violation of their right to free speech guaranteed under the First Amendment of the 
American Constitution.81 This case was the first in the US to rule that forced speech 
could be an impingement on a person’s First Amendment right.82 While Barnette 
involved statements of “sentiment” and “opinion”, later cases have relied on it to 
prevent coercion to disclose more factual information.83 For example, the Court in 
Riley v National Federation of the Blind held that, by requiring professional 
fundraisers to disclose to potential donors the gross percentage of revenues retained in 
prior charitable solicitations, the North Carolina Charitable Solicitations Act 
constituted a breach of the First Amendment.84  
 
Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the New Zealand courts would consider 
freedom of expression to include a right to silence, or a right to choose what or what 
not to express, so forcing a defendant to publish a reply presumably infringes free 
speech. This section considers the main rationales that underpin freedom of 
expression in order to explain why it is protected and further examine how a right of 
reply might restrict free speech. 
 
There are three main underlying rationales for the protection of free speech:85 
                                                        
78 Thompson v Police [2013] 1 NZLR 848 at [76]. 
79 Slaight Communications Inc v Davidson (1989) 59 DLR (4th) 416 at [95] (as per Lamer J). 
80 West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
81 At 625. See also: Laurie Allen Gallancy “Teachers and the Pledge of Allegiance” (1990) 57 U Chic 
L Rev 929 at 931. 
82 Gallancy, above n 81, at 932. 
83 Riley v National Federation of the Blind  (1988) 487 US 781 at 797-798. See also: Gallancy, above n 
81, at 932. 
84 Riley v National Federation of the Blind, above n 83, at 784. 
85 Geiringer and Price, above n 76, at 320. See also: Brooker v Police [2007] 3 NZLR 91 at [114] per 
McGrath J; Hosking v Runting [2005] 1 NZLR 1 at [233] per Tipping J; Morse v R [2010] 2 NZLR 625 
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a) Self-fulfillment 
b) The importance of discovering truth 
c) Participation in democracy 
A Self-fulfillment 
 
“A right to express beliefs and political attitudes instantiates or reflects what it is to be 
human.”86 Under the self-fulfilment rationale, free speech is an intrinsic good, which 
can lead to more insightful and mature individuals, thus benefiting society as a 
whole.87 If certain ideas or opinions are restricted, individuals who wish to pursue or 
explore those ideas may end up frustrated and consider the restrictions affronts to 
their inherent human dignity.88 People should be treated as capable of rational and 
autonomous thought by allowing them all the information possible to make well-
informed, rational, autonomous decisions.89 This underlying principle applies to all 
kinds of expression, including hate speech, but it does not easily extend to non-natural 
persons, such as corporations and the media.90 
 
A right of reply directly contravenes the self-fulfilment rationale by disallowing an 
individual to freely choose what he might wish to express. Forcing a person to state 
something they don’t believe or don’t wish to say may frustrate them and make them 
feel like they are not being given the opportunity to rationally and autonomously 
conduct themselves. This rationale applies to all forms of speech, and so almost any 
forced online communication could impact a person’s dignity and right to self-
determination and fulfilment. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
at [86]; Vincent Blasi “Free Speech and Good Character: From Milton to Brandeis to the Present” in 
Lee C. Bollinger and Geoffrey R Stone (eds) Eternally Vigilant: Free Speech in the Modern Era 
(University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2002) at 61. 
86 Eric Barendt Freedom of Speech (2nd ed, Oxford University Press, New York, 2005) at 13. 
87 At 13. 
88 Kent Greenawalt “Free Speech Justifications” (1989) 89 Colum L Rev 119 at 145. 
89 At 150. 
90 Barendt, above n 86, at 15-16. 
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B The Importance of Discovering Truth 
 
The discovery of truth is generally associated with John Stuart Mill.91 Mill’s position 
was that truth is a fundamentally good concept, and particular truths are capable of 
being discovered and legitimized.92 Mill’s theory rests on the idea that truth will be 
discovered through open debate. Neither true nor false speech should be prohibited, as 
both are required to challenge and defend ideas.93 Moreover, if restrictions start being 
placed on speech, even if it is seen to be false, there is a chance that true speech will 
also be suppressed.94 This is also known as the “marketplace of ideas” theory.95 It is 
unclear whether Mill envisaged the same protection for all types of speech; his theory 
leaves open the question of whether or not a distinction should be drawn between 
claims of fact and opinion.96 Propositions that cannot be objectively tested, such as 
hate speech, may fall outside of Mill’s protection.97 This rationale is also not very 
helpful when it comes to situations where the speech complained of is not false but 
there may still be justifications for suppressing it, as in cases of breach of confidence 
or privacy.98 Although, according to this rationale, one could say that most speech on 
the Internet contributes to the marketplace of ideas, as even false speech should not be 
prohibited in order to challenge and reveal the truth.   
 
A right of reply may make people less inclined to publish information on the Internet; 
people may feel like there is little point in expressing their own opinions if they are 
just going to be forced to publish a reply. This is regarded as the “chilling effect” on 
free speech.99 The chilling effect results in less available information, which might 
result in a less robust marketplace of ideas. In the case of Miami Herald Publishing 
Co. v Tornillo (Miami Herald case),100 the US Supreme Court ruled a right of reply 
provision to be unconstitutional in relation to the First Amendment guarantee of a free 
                                                        
91 Barendt, above n 86, at 7. 
92 At 7-8. 
93 At 8. See also: Lange v Atkinson and Australian Consolidated Press New Zealand Ltd, above n 14, at 
50-51. 
94 Greenawalt, above n 88, at 130. 
95 Barendt, above n 86, at 11. 
96 At 9-10. 
97 At 10. 
98 Barendt, above n 86, at 10. 
99 Andras Koltay “The Right of Reply: A Comparative Approach” (2007) 4 Iustum Aequum Salutare 
203 at 205. 
100 Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). 
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press due to a primary concern was that a right of reply would chill speech from the 
media;101 it might prevent the media from publishing certain stories, stifling the 
marketplace of ideas. The Court held that newspapers should be able to freely choose 
what they wish to publish and rejected the “access-argument” that the public should 
have access to non-monopolising media in order to have a fully functioning 
marketplace of ideas.102   
 
The US First Amendment rights include rights of both the speaker and the listener, 
but the speaker’s interests are paramount.103 Listeners have a right to genuine 
expression, as they are entitled to an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in order to seek 
truth.104 A right of reply may force a speaker to relay disingenuous statements, which 
could create bias in the marketplace, whilst the chilling effect of a right of reply might 
also prevent information from being contributed to the marketplace from the very 
beginning, thereby infringing listeners’ interests in having access to an unbiased and 
thriving marketplace of ideas. 
C Participation in Democracy 
 
The argument from democracy posits that, the more the public is informed, the better 
their government and subsequent political decisions will be.105 This principle rests on 
the assumption that democracy is the best form of governance and social 
organisation.106 Democracy is conceptualised as rule by the people; the government 
acts as a servant, and the people must be fully informed to make their own decisions 
regarding governance.107 Since the people are sovereign, it should not be up to the 
government to decide what is true, especially when it comes to political 
information.108  
 
                                                        
101 Larry Alexander “Compelled Speech” (2006) 23 Const Comment 147 at 149-150. 
102 Charles Danziger “The Right of Reply in the United States and Europe” (1986-1987) 19 NYU J 
Int’l L & Pol 171 at 176-177. 
103 Dayna B Royal “Resolving the Compelled-Commercial-Speech Conundrum” (2011) 19 Va J Soc 
Pol’y & L 205 at 208. 
104 At 210. 
105 Greenawalt, above n 88, at 146. 
106 Frederick Schauer Free Speech: a philosophical enquiry (Cambridge University Press, New York, 
1982) at 35. 
107 At 38. 
108 Schauer, above n 106, at 39. 
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It is too simplistic to suggest that only political speech contributes to the formation of 
political ideas and the participation in democracy.109 Democracy requires its 
participants to be fully engaged with political issues so they can form their own 
informed opinions and then vote according to them.110 It therefore requires citizens to 
be the type of people that engage with issues and are capable of forming such 
opinions. A citizen is more likely to become such a person if he feels he is a valued 
member of society, worthy of equal respect and human dignity.111 As discussed above, 
freedom to express opinions, especially unpopular ones, can be essential to one’s 
sense of self-worth and human dignity, which is “a foundational part of the political 
and civic cultures of pluralistic democracy.”112 Moreover, a citizen should have 
enough knowledge to put political issues into context. In these ways, the argument 
from democracy incorporates both the truth and self-fulfilment rationales of freedom 
of expression.  
 
One could argue that free speech is at least more likely than suppression to mould 
individuals into agents that can and will participate in a democratic system by 
encouraging rationality through the free marketplace of ideas, extending the 
democratic participation rationale to some non-political expression.113 By not 
allowing individuals to freely choose what they wish to express, and potentially 
restricting information from the marketplace or preventing self-fulfilling speech 
through a chilling effect, the right of reply impinges both the rationales of self-
fulfilment and the search for truth. This can prevent individuals from becoming the 
autonomous and rational individuals required by a functional democratic society. In 
this way, a right of reply arguably infringes the rationale of democratic participation. 
 
However, insofar as the argument from democracy engages with the marketplace 
rationale, this theory of free speech rests on the assumption of “equal competence and 
universal rationality” arguably not found amongst the general public.114 A more 
                                                        
109 Juliet Moses “Hate Speech: Competing Rights to Freedom of Expression” (1996) 8 Auckland U L 
Rev 185 at 192. 
110 Lange v Atkinson and Australian Consolidated Press New Zealand Ltd, above n 14, at 46. See also: 
Hopkinson v Police [2004] 3 NZLR 704 (HC) at [20]. 
111 Barendt, above n 86, at 20. 
112 Randal Marlin Propaganda and the Ethics of Persuasion (Broadview Press Ltd, Ontario, 2002) at 
231. 
113 Blasi, above n 83, at 85-87. 
114 Blasi, above n 83, at 39-41. 
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persuasive argument for democracy as a basis for free speech is its ability to be used 
as a check on government powers.115 Moreover, by allowing citizens to speak freely, 
freedom of expression can preserve society and prevent revolution and social harm by 
allowing people to vent their frustrations instead.116 This would narrow the 
application of this free speech principle to public or political matters.117 The US 
Supreme Court in the Miami Herald case argued that a right of reply can directly 
impinge on the functioning of democracy.118 Listeners’ interests are central to 
compelled speech cases in the US, particularly where speakers are forced to 
disingenuously persuade listeners towards the government’s position, as this 
undermines the true consent of those being governed making it unacceptable in a 
democracy.119 Listeners have the right to hear free expression unrestrained by 
government compulsion.120  
D Conclusion 
 
A right of reply not only infringes a speaker’s right to self-fulfillment, but also 
negatively impacts listeners’ interests in the search for truth and the functioning of 
democracy,121 constituting an infringement on freedom of expression. 
 
VI Balancing Freedom of Expression and Protection of Reputation: What 
is the Best Form of a Right of Reply? 
 
Since a right of reply constitutes a prima facie breach of freedom of expression, this 
section determines whether this breach is demonstrably justifiable in a free and 
democratic society according to section 5 of the NZBORA. This paper considers the 
test set out by Tipping J in the New Zealand Supreme Court decision of R v Hansen, 
                                                        
115 at 43-44. 
116 Marlin, above n 112, at 228. 
117 Schauer, above n 106, at 44. 
118 Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, above n 100. See also Danziger, above n 102, at 176. 
119 Royal, above n 103, at 208. 
120 At 210. 
121 At 211-212. 
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as his methodology has since been endorsed by the Court of Appeal in Ministry of 
Health v Atkinson:122 
 
(a)  does the limiting measure serve a purpose sufficiently important to justify curtailment 
of the right or freedom?  
(b)  
(i) is the limiting measure rationally connected with its purpose?  
(ii) does the limiting measure impair the right or freedom no more than is reasonably 
necessary for sufficient achievement of its purpose?  
(iii) is the limit in due proportion to the importance of the objective?  
 
The scope and availability of a right of reply will influence how justified its breach of 
freedom of expression is. In light of this, this section also considers when and how a 
right of reply should be used under this new regime in order to constitute a limit on 
freedom of expression that is no more than reasonably necessary to protect reputation.  
A Does the Limiting Measure Serve a Purpose Sufficiently Important to 
Justify Curtailment of the Right or Freedom?  
 
The first question to ask when dealing with a limitation on a right is whether the 
objective sought by that limitation is sufficiently important.123  Both Tipping J regards 
this limb as a threshold test, with a lot of deference being given to Parliament on the 
issue.124 This means that, where a limiting measure is a matter of policy, according to 
Tipping J, it will be easily satisfied and the courts should not need to engage in much 
detailed analysis. However, for the purposes of this paper, this section provides a 
more detailed examination as to whether a right of reply does indeed serve an 
important purpose.  
 
 
                                                        
122 R v Hansen [2007] NZSC 7 [2007] 3 NZLR 1 at [104] as per Tipping J and Ministry of Health v 
Atkinson [2012] 3 NZLR 456 (CA) at [143]. 
123 R v Hansen, above n 122, at [104]. 
124 At [121] as per Tipping J. See also [203] and [207] as per McGrath J. 
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1 The purpose of a right of reply 
 
A right of reply is typically a remedy for defamation or infringement of personality 
rights.125  Germany and France’s right of reply provisions are designed to protect 
personality rights endorsed in their Civil Codes and the European Convention on 
Human Rights.126 Grounds for a right of personality can be found in a number of 
French and German statutes.127  In English, Article 2(1) of Germany’s Basic Law 
states that:128 
 
Every person shall have the right to free development of his personality insofar as he does not violate 
the rights of others or offend against the constitutional order or the moral law. 
 
Whilst Article 1(1) says, “Human dignity shall be inviolable. To respect and protect it 
shall be the duty of all state authority."129 Section 823 of the German Civil Code 
states that:130 
 
A person who, intentionally or negligently, unlawfully injures the life, body, health, 
freedom, property or another right of another person is liable to make compensation to 
the other party for the damage arising from this. 
 
Personality rights are considered “another right” under section 823.131 Article 9 of the 
French Civil Code states that:   
 
Everyone has the right to respect for his private life.  
Without prejudice to compensation for injury suffered, the court may prescribe any 
measures, such as sequestration, seizure and others, appropriate to prevent or put an end 
                                                        
125 Youm above n 13, at 1038. See also:  McNamara, above n 14, at 92. 
126 Georges Rouhette and Anne Rouhette-Berton “English Translation of the French Civil Code” (4 
April 2006) Legifrance <http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/Traductions/en-English/Legifrance-
translations>, art 9. See also: Gounalakis, above n 13, at 66 and 69. 
127 Gounalakis, above n 13, at 66 and 69. 
128 Inter Nationes “English Translation of Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany 
(Grundgesetz, GG)” IUSCOMP <http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/statutes/GG.htm#2> art 2(1). 
129 Inter Nationes, above n 128, Art 1(1). 
130 Civil Code in the version promulgated on 2 January 2002 (Federal Law Gazette [Bundesgesetzblatt] 
I page 42, 2909; 2003 I page 738), last amended by Article 1 of the statute of 27 July 2011 (Federal 
Law Gazette I page 1600 < http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_bgb/englisch_bgb.html>, s 823 
131 Raymond Young “Marlene Dietrich Case BGH 1 ZR 49/97 (1 December 1999)” (1 December 2005) 
The University of Texas: School of Law 
<http://www.utexas.edu/law/academics/centers/transnational/work_new/german/case.php?id=726>  
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to an invasion of personal privacy; in case of emergency those measures may be 
provided for by interim order.  
 
Finally, Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights states that:132 
 
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence.  
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such 
as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of 
national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention 
of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights 
and freedoms of others.  
 
New Zealand does not have a general right to personality or respect for private life in 
the NZBORA.133 New Zealand has affirmed a right to privacy in the development of 
the privacy tort,134 though it is still in its infancy and not the equivalent of a general 
right to personality akin to Article 8.135  However, the New Zealand legal system has 
long enforced defamation laws.136 The raison d’être of defamation law is to protect 
reputation.137 Thus, New Zealand has arguably affirmed a right to protection of 
reputation through the implementation of defamation laws,138 for which right of reply 
has been used as a remedy in other jurisdictions.139 Therefore it makes more sense for 
the New Zealand courts to implement a right of reply on the basis of reputational 
rights as opposed to a general personality right. This section will examine the 
rationales behind an individual’s right to have their reputation protected, and how a 
right of reply advances those rationales. 
                                                        
132 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as amended 
by Protocols Nos 11 and 14 5 ETS (4 November 1950) art 8. (European Convention on Human Rights) 
133 Andrew Butler and Petra Butler “Protecting Rights” in Caroline Morris, Jonathan Boston and Petra 
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134 Hosking v Runting, above n 83, at [148] as per Gault P and Blanchard J, and [259] as per Tipping J. 
135 Huw Beverley-Smith, Ansgar Ohly and Agnes Lucas-Schloetter, above n 15, at 207. 
136 Ursula Cheer and John Burrows “Defamation” in Stephen Todd et all (eds) The Law of Torts in New 
Zealand (6th ed, Brookers, Wellington, 2013) at 811-812. See also: Defamation Act 1954 and 
Defamation Act 1992. 
137 McNamara, above n 14, at 92. See also: Lange v Atkinson and Australian Consolidated Press NZ 
Ltd, above n 14, at 30 and Television New Zealand Ltd v Quinn, above n 14, at 37-38. 
138 See discussion in: Lange v Atkinson and Australian Consolidated Press NZ Ltd, above n 14, at 30 
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139 Donnelly, above n 12, at 884-885. 
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2 Rights to reputation 
 
The rationales for protection of reputation are not as well-defined as the ones for 
freedom of speech.140 Nonetheless, historically, the common law has been very 
protective of it.141 Indeed, since the turn of the nineteenth century, protection of 
reputation has been the raison d’etre of defamation law.142 Reputation has since been 
seen as something inherently good, deserving of protection.143 Moreover, it is 
recognised in Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,144 
as well as Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights.145 Reputations are 
basically social judgements of individuals based on facts considered relevant by their 
particular community.146 They are what distinguish us; without a reputation, one 
could almost be considered a nonentity.147  
 
Reputation forms the basis for decisions about who to employ, or do business with, or 
vote for,148  as it can be considered a means by which to judge a person’s 
trustworthiness. Trust can be seen as linked to the concept of social capital.149 “Social 
capital” features networks, norms and values which aid cooperation and organization 
between two or more people for mutual benefit.150 When a group of people become 
embedded in these norms and values, they have a better idea as to whether or not they 
should trust each other and normally trust will ensue.151 Trust stabilises and increases 
cohesion and facilitates cooperation and success within society, whilst benefiting 
individuals by encouraging boldness and creativity and enriching their personal 
relationships.152 A person’s reputation can be evidence upon which people will pass 
                                                        
140 Robert C Post “The Social Foundations of Defamation Law: Reputation and the Constitution”  
(1986) 74 Cal Rev 691 at 692. 
141 Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd [2001] 2 AC 127 at 192. 
142 McNamara, above n 14, at 92. 
143 At 94. 
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148 Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd, above n 141, at 201. 
149 Francis Fukuyama “Differing Disciplinary Perspectives on the Origins of Trust” (2001) 81 B U L 
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150 At 480. 
151 At 480. 
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judgment as to whether they are trustworthy or not,153 and therefore whether or not 
they should be readily included within a societal framework. Protection of reputation 
can therefore be seen as a public, as well as individual, good.154  
 
Robert Post posits three possible underlying rationales for the protection of 
reputation:155 
 
(a) property;  
(b) honour; or  
(c) dignity  
 
How one conceptualises the rationales underpinning protection of reputation can 
affect the outcome of one’s analysis comparing freedom of expression and a right to 
reputation.156 This paper agrees with Post that dignity is the most appropriate rationale 
for protection of reputation. 
(a) Property 
 
Reputation can be seen as the fruits of hard work and skill in integrity and honourable 
living, and to injure a person’s reputation is to destroy those hard-earned results, 
making it something akin to a person’s property.157 Thus, defamation law only 
protects measurable harms to reputation and not mere hurt feelings.158 However, this 
theory of reputation cannot explain why, in defamation law, a claimant must prove a 
communication was defamatory in order to succeed, even if the communication has 
caused a pecuniary or personal loss.159 Moreover, often claimants, especially if they 
are in the public eye, don’t bring defamation suits solely for damages; rather, they sue 
to vindicate their reputation.160 Furthermore, a presumption of damages can often be 
seen as an unjustified windfall in a market society.161  
                                                        
153 At 644. 
154 Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd, above n 141, at 201. 
155 Post, above n 140, at 693. 
156 At 722. 
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(b) Honour 
 
The theory of honour as the basis of reputation places the value of reputation above 
that of the market by making it a form of honour.162 Post argues that, instead of 
building honour themselves, people claim a right to it by virtue of their social status; 
one must live up to this honour by personifying those attributes.163 Thus, this theory 
presupposes inequality, and gives reputation a fixed value.164 The honour rationale is 
therefore best reserved for hierarchical societies. Honour cannot be obtained 
individually through hard work; instead it is attributed to certain social roles, though it 
can be lost through inappropriate behaviour.165 This suggests that people cannot 
rebuild their reputations through hard work, which is not always the case. Reputations 
are worth protecting, because damage to reputation also constitutes damage to the 
social status within which society has invested.166 This theory endeavours to explain 
the distinction between “defamatory” and “non-defamatory” remarks by 
conceptualising them as a question of whether the communication impacts honour or 
not.167 Moreover, damages can be seen as a means of vindicating the claimant’s 
honour, even when there is no pecuniary loss.168 However, the idea that everyone is 
equal before the law, which is embedded in many Western democratic societies, 
suggests a rejection of the honour rationale.169  
(c) Dignity 
 
The last rationale advanced by Post is the dignity rationale, which posits that every 
person has essential human dignity and should be treated accordingly.170 This system 
is played out through rules of deference and demeanour; deference is conduct through 
which a person conveys appreciation to a person about that person, whilst demeanour 
is conduct by which an individual expresses his own personal qualities.171 Through 
                                                        
162 Post, above n 140, at 699. 
163 At 700. 
164 At 700. 
165 At 701. 
166 At 702. 
167 At 706. 
168 At 706. 
169 At 726. 
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this system, “an individual must rely on others to complete the picture of him of 
which he himself is allowed to paint only in certain parts.”172 Our sense of self-worth 
is dependent on the respect it is given from other people; the dignity that defamation 
law protects is the respect that comes from full participation in society.173 The rules of 
deference and demeanour serve as social boundaries to preserve the stability of 
communal life.174 Defamation laws can be regarded as a means of preventing 
breaches of rules of deference and demeanour.175 They also serve to help define what 
a community is; “a community is a community because its members share an idea of 
what is ‘decent’”.176  
 
A common test for defamation within the law of New Zealand is whether a statement 
has lowered the plaintiff in the eyes of a right-thinking member of society.177 By 
determining what a right-thinking society believes, defamation law determines who is 
excluded and who is included within a certain conception of society.178 The law thus 
protects an individual’s interest in being included within the boundaries of social 
respect, while enforcing society’s interest in maintaining and defining its own social 
constitution.179 Recognition is what makes society functional, and reputation is an 
extension of that recognition.180 According to this theory, dignity is intrinsic and 
cannot be repaired through monetary compensation.181 Instead, a successful 
defamation claim provides the plaintiff with affirmation of membership in the 
community, designating them as worthy of respect.182  
3 Conclusion on the rationales for protecting reputation 
 
The honour model is limited to societies where social roles are well-established and 
used as a basis for determining social conduct; it is therefore no longer an adequate 
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model for society today.183 Instead, the conception of reputation as dignity better fits 
our modern, egalitarian and liberal society. A focus on individualism within society 
could be what leads to the impression that reputation is individualistic and more like 
property.184 A focus on individual success makes us forget how much we rely on 
others to succeed.185 This indicates a less individualistic conception of reputation and 
suggests that it is more of a public good, which coincides with the dignity rationale.186 
This paper therefore considers that the dignity rationale is the most persuasive 
argument for protecting reputation. Consequently, the objective of a right of reply can 
be conceptualised as protecting individuals from statements that lower them in the 
eyes of right-thinking members of society, preventing them from being accurately and 
fairly judged and included within society as people deserving of equal respect and 
human dignity. This is an important objective, and should easily satisfy this threshold 
limb of the test set out in R v Hansen.   
B Proportionality 
 
The following three stages of the Hansen analysis are concerned with proportionality. 
In determining whether a right of reply is a proportional limit on freedom of 
expression, it is important to establish when exactly a right of reply should be used 
and what form it should take. In order to do so, this paper draws on other established 
rights of reply in both New Zealand law and in other jurisdictions. The following 
sections will consider the rights of reply available in France, Germany and South 
Korea, well as aspects of the Broadcasting Standards Authority’s (BSA) power to 
order the publication of statements and apologies because, like the right of reply 
proposed by the Commission, they are statutorily based.  
  
Where a complaint is justified, the BSA has the power to make:187 
 
an order directing the broadcaster to publish, in such manner as shall be specified in the 
order, and within such period as shall be so specified, a statement that relates to the 
complaint and that is approved by the Authority for the purpose  
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This statement could be a general statement about the BSA’s findings on a particular 
case, or an apology,188 and the BSA is entitled to review the statement to make sure it 
meets their approval before it is published.189 
 
The French Press Act of 1881, which is still in force, sets out a right of reply in two 
ways: droit de rectification (right of rectification) for government officials (Article 
12) and droit de reponse (right of reply) for ordinary individuals.190 This paper will 
focus on the droit de reponse because it would appear that the right of reply under the 
new regime might be available to ordinary citizens. A French Draft Decree regarding 
the right of reply on the Internet was proposed in 2007.191 It stipulates that the right of 
reply should be granted if a challenged Internet site refuses an opportunity for direct 
reply through forums or chat rooms. 192 The German right of reply, which is “central 
to the rules of the state press laws,” was “transplanted from the French Press Law of 
1822 into the Baden Press Law of 1831 and then into the Imperial Press Law of 1874 
as a demand for ‘correction.’” It is now incorporated into German law as a statutory 
concept through the Länder (federal states) press laws.193 Given the lack of 
availability of English translations of German legislation, this paper focuses on the 
right of reply provisions in the Press Law for the Free and Hanseatic City of 
Hamburg.194 Finally, South Korea first recognized the right of reply in 1980 under the 
Basic Press Act.195 In 2005, the Korean National Assembly enacted the Act on Press 
Arbitration and Remedies, etc., for Damage Caused by Press Reports (“Press 
Arbitration Act”) as a comprehensive legal framework for news media-related 
complaints, which includes a provision detailing aspects of a right of reply.196  
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i) Is the Limiting Measure Rationally Connected with its Purpose?  
 
The first question in the proportionality analysis asks whether a limit on a right is 
rationally connected with the objective it is trying to advance.197 Therefore, this 
section addresses whether a right of reply actually protects reputation. This paper 
agrees with Tipping J’s assertion that this limb is also a threshold test, with a lot of 
deference given to Parliament;198 there should simply be a connection between the 
ends and means, but if there is no connection at all, then the limitation on freedom of 
expression cannot be justified. Tipping regards this limb as easily satisfied, because 
whether or not a limit is justified is essentially whether it is a justified end achieved 
by proportionate means;199 a question which is dealt with under the last two limbs of 
the Hansen test. With regards to the new regime, whether a right of reply actually 
protects reputation will depend on the circumstances in which it is used. A right of 
reply will not be the appropriate remedy for all harmful digital communications under 
the new regime because it should be limited to situations where a communication is 
harmful because it damages a person’s reputation, and a right of reply will help repair 
it.  
1 How does a right of reply protect reputation? 
 
A right of reply can protect reputation by allowing a person to air their side of the 
story, encouraging people to fairly and accurately judge and include them within 
society as a person of equal respect and dignity. In this way, the right of reply 
advances the dignity rationale. A right of reply similarly advances the other rationales 
for the protection of reputation. A reply promotes the honour rationale by serving as 
vindication of one’s honour and reputation. It can also extend to the property rationale, 
albeit in a less direct way, because it could stymie pecuniary loss but would not 
directly compensate for loss already suffered. 
 
A right of reply will not serve to protect reputation in all of the circumstances set out 
by the Commission under this new regime. Indeed, a reply would have almost nothing 
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to do with reputation when invoked against grossly offensive or threatening 
statements. This paper submits that a right of reply should only be used where a 
person’s reputation is at stake, and a right of reply would adequately serve to protect 
that person’s reputation. Under the new regime, a right of reply could thus be used to 
remedy the disclosure of sensitive personal facts, false allegations, or breach of 
confidence, where they prevent an individual from being accurately and fairly judged 
and included within society as people deserving of equal respect and human dignity.  
2  Why a right of reply should extend beyond remedying false allegations that harm 
reputation 
 
If the objective of a right of reply is to protect reputation, its application should 
extend to all situations where a statement harms reputation. In his book, The Future of 
Reputation, Daniel Solove explains why it may be relevant to restrict the revelation of 
sensitive facts about a person in order to protect their reputation.200  The 
dissemination of true facts can sometimes have a disproportionately detrimental effect 
on reputation. Sometimes it is important for us to conceal information about ourselves 
that other people might use to our disadvantage.201 This reasoning justifies the 
censoring of falsehoods that damage our reputations.202 The question is, how much 
more control should we have over our reputations?203 Should we be entitled to restrict 
the amount of true information about ourselves available in the public sphere?204 Too 
much control can be restrictive on free speech, but too little control can lead to 
detrimental effects on reputation that can also affect people’s liberty.205  A right of 
reply can strike a balance between these two concerns. 
 
Gossip is fundamental to the establishment of reputations; reputations only exist 
within the conversations we have about one another.206 Through gossip, we expose 
people’s moral and normative infringements, thus making it an essential tool for 
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maintaining societal norms.207 The problem is that gossip is usually a mixture of half-
truths and gossipers rarely seek out the full story.208 Often true information can be 
disseminated out of context, which could cause someone to form a distorted view 
about a person.209 
 
Our knowledge of other people is often ‘empty canvas’. There’s a lot we don’t know 
about our coworkers, our friends, and even our family members. When we discover new 
information about people, we can fill in the canvas, but we still often only have partial 
understanding.210  
 
Moreover, we conduct ourselves differently depending on our environment. The 
persona we adopt at work may differ enormously from the person we are in the 
comforts of our own home.211 Solove suggests there is no “true” self, we are all 
configurations of several dimensions or facets; which dimension you reveal at a given 
time is made by a value judgement.212 Thus, new information about a person, revealed 
out of context, will not lead to a discovery of a “true” self and can instead be rather 
jarring and distorting,213 and people have a tendency to make irrational judgements 
based on stigmatised characteristics, especially when taken out of context.214 Society 
expects a person’s “public self” to be less revealing, and unintended revelations of 
private information take away a person’s right to self-determine when and if to reveal 
certain aspects about themselves, and may result in them being judged harshly for 
unwittingly revealing too much.215  A right of reply can help to put sensitve facts into 
context to make them less jarring and distorting. Where any information, whether true 
or false, has been disseminated in a way that prevents society from fairly or accurately 
judging a person as worthy of equal respect and dignity and inclusion within society, 
then a right of reply might be a justifiable remedy in order to restore a claimant’s 
reputation. 
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3 Conclusion on rational connection 
 
If, like our defamation law, a right of reply is grounded in the idea that protection of 
one’s reputation is important, in order for it to be considered rationally connected to 
its objective, a right of reply should only be used against statements that have 
damaged reputation. In order to constitute damage to reputation, a statement must 
prevent a person from being accurately and fairly judged and included within society 
as someone deserving of equal respect and human dignity. This means that any 
statement that negatively affects a person’s reputation could justify a right of reply, 
but the remedy could not simply be used against any untruth. For example, where 
sensitive personal facts have been given out of context, leading people to form unfair 
or distorted judgments about an individual, then a right of reply might be 
appropriately used to give the information context.  
 
Under the newly proposed regime, a right of reply could potentially be used in cases 
where sensitive personal facts have been disclosed (principle one), or confidence has 
been breached (principle eight), or where false allegations have been made (principle 
seven), which has led to prejudiced or unfair judgement of the claimant. In summary, 
because a limit on freedom of expression must be rationally connected to its objective, 
a right of reply should only be limited to circumstances where it advances the 
protection of reputation, because otherwise it is not connected to its objective at all. 
ii) Does the limiting measure impair the right or freedom no more 
than is reasonably necessary for sufficient achievement of its 
purpose? 
 
The second stage of the proportionality analysis considers whether there are 
alternative, but less intrusive means of achieving Parliament’s objective.216 The 
question to consider here is whether any other remedies under the new regime protect 
reputation whilst imposing less of an infringement on a defendant’s right to free 
speech. Since the Commission and the Social Policy Committee have left a right of 
reply undefined, this section first considers when a right of reply might be used, and 
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what form it should take, in order for it to constitute a minimal impairment on free 
speech whilst suitably meeting its objective of protecting reputation. It then examines 
other remedies available under the new regime, and any other measures claimants 
could use to protect themselves, and considers whether these other means infringe 
freedom of expression less than a proposed right of reply.  
1 When a right of reply should be used 
(a) Distinctions between fact and opinion 
 
There is a question as to whether a right of reply should apply to statements of both 
fact and opinion, or just statements of fact. Under French law relating to newspaper 
publications, any statement, whether of fact or opinion, that relates to a claimant’s 
personality, can be subject to a right of reply.217 On the other hand, German and South 
Korean rights of reply will only apply in relation to inaccurate facts.218  This section 
explains why it is desirable to distinguish between fact and opinion under this new 
regime, even though both types of statement can harm reputation, and explains how a 
Court should go about making that distinction under this new regime. 
 
(i) Why it is important to distinguish between fact and opinion 
 
New Zealand’s defamation law currently distinguishes between fact and opinion 
through use of a defence of honest opinion, often referred to as “fair comment” in 
other jurisdictions.219  Statements of honest opinion are exempt from defamation 
claims because they embody the rationales underpinning freedom of expression more 
than statements of fact. Airing one’s opinion can be self-fulfilling in the sense that, if 
one’s opinion was censored for being irrational or inadequately developed, it could 
affect an individual’s self-worth by causing them to feel less worthy of equal respect 
and human dignity.  All opinions contribute to the marketplace of ideas in the search 
for truth, and the theory posits that any disparity arising from irrational opinions will 
work itself out within the marketplace of ideas where truth always wins out in the 
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end.220 The right to participate in the democratic process includes the right to develop 
well-informed political opinions, and one can determine if an opinion is well-
developed and informed by having it challenged by opposing opinions.221  
 
Opinions are often distinguished from fact by their lack of verifiability.222 The more 
verifiable a statement is, the more factual it is in nature. The defence of honest 
opinion originated due to the lack of verifiability of opinions; without the defence, 
any defamatory statement that could not be verified would result in a win for the 
claimant.223 The lack of protection could lead to a chilling effect on speech, as people 
would be reluctant to air their own opinions, even if they were based on reasonable 
grounds,224 resulting in a stagnant marketplace of ideas.  
 
However, the distinction between fact and opinion fails to acknowledge the influence 
of the speaker.225 Even if the writer clearly identifies a statement they have made as 
opinion, if that person is of particular importance or social standing, a reader may still 
treat their opinion as fact, perhaps thinking that there are other undisclosed facts upon 
which the statement was based.226 Ungrounded or biased opinions can be just as 
damaging as misstated facts.227 Even so, statements of honest opinion engage the 
rationales of free speech theory in a way that misstatements of fact do not, so it is 
nonetheless desirable to distinguish between the two in order to satisfactorily balance 
the defendant’s freedom of expression against a claimant’s right to have their 
reputation protected. This is a question to be considered in more depth under the last 
limb of the Hansen balancing test. 
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(ii) How to distinguish between fact and opinion 
 
In determining whether a statement is fact or opinion, the New Zealand courts have 
taken a context-based approach,228 which is advocated by Rodney Ott.229 Context can 
colour the meaning of words and can influence the degree of ambiguity surrounding 
them.230 For example, the words, “Dr Smith is a murderer” could be considered a 
factual statement that is defamatory. However, when you place them on a placard 
outside an abortion clinic where Dr Smith works, they start to seem more like 
opinion.231 In determining whether a statement is fact, a factor to consider is its 
precision or verifiability,232 and context can shape how precise a statement is.233 The 
more certainty one can have in the verifiability of a statement, the more factual it is. 
For example, the fact that “X owns a Ford Focus” can be checked out to a high level 
of certainty.234 However, not everything considered “fact” fits into this narrow 
conception.235 For example, one might consider the statement that “cigarettes are bad 
for your health” to be a factual statement, yet it cannot be held up to the same 
standard of verifiability as the Ford Focus statement.236 Thus, verifiability can be 
considered as a spectrum; the more verifiable a statement, the more confident we can 
be that it is factual in nature.237 At the opposite end of the spectrum are purely 
normative judgments of the individual speaker,238 as value judgments are almost 
impossible to verify.239 
 
Herbert Titus gives further guidance by suggesting that the test for whether a 
statement is opinion or fact should rest on the “probability that the reader or the hearer 
will be misled in the formation of what he thinks of the person talked about”.240 The 
probability of this occurring is higher when the facts upon which the writer has based 
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his opinion have been withheld from the reader.241 Therefore, in order to have a 
statement classified as opinion, it “must inform its reader or hearer why the writer or 
the speaker thinks the way he does about the person talked about.”242 Thus, for 
example, the statement that “X is immoral” may be regarded as fact because the 
reader assumes the writer has some facts to base this conclusion on.243 Whereas the 
statement that “X stole money from Y and is therefore immoral” is a clear mixture of 
fact and opinion,244 as readers are left free to decide for themselves whether stealing 
money is immoral or not. This reasoning is mirrored in Lord Phillips’ judgment in the 
English Supreme Court decision of Joseph v Spiller, 245 endorsing Lord Nicholls’ 
reasoning in the Hong Kong Court of Appeal decision in Tse Wai Chun v Cheng.246 
Lord Phillips is of the view that a statement will be regarded as opinion where it 
identifies, at least in general terms, why the writer made that comment, so the reader 
can understand what the statement is about, and the commentator can explain why 
they expressed the views that they did when challenged about it.247 Under Lord 
Phillips’ view, there is no need to explicitly (or implicitly) point to the facts upon 
which the statement was based,248 but it would be desirable to indicate the nature of 
the facts upon which the statement is made.249 By divulging the nature of the facts 
upon which a conclusion is made, the writer will give readers more context, and help 
to clarify what was meant by the conclusion. 
 
(iii) Conclusion  
 
The Court should determine whether a statement is fact or opinion by considering the 
context within which it was made, how likely it is to mislead a reader, whether facts 
upon which a statement was made have been provided, and how verifiable the 
statement is. Whether or not a statement is fact or opinion will be a relevant 
consideration at the last stage of the balancing test, when considering the value of the 
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speech used in the original harmful communication and whether a right of reply is a 
proportional response.  
(b) Exemptions 
 
In Germany and South Korea, fair and accurate reports of open governmental 
proceedings and commercial adverts are exempt from right of reply orders.250 This 
paper does not think that a right of reply should not be available for use against 
commercial adverts online. There has been an increase of false testimonials for 
products and services online.251 Companies have resorted to scouring Facebook for 
people’s full names and photos and then using them to endorse their products without 
their knowledge.252 Although a takedown might be considered suitable in such cases, 
a reply would have the effect of not only getting the claimant’s side of the story out in 
the open, but it would also expose the truth about that particular company’s unethical 
exploits.  
 
In New Zealand, fair and accurate reports of Parliamentary proceedings are exempt 
from defamation claims,253 unless they were motivated by ill will.254 Parliamentary 
privilege exists to enable Parliamentarians to effectively carry out their duties,255 
whilst reports of proceedings are protected because it is considered “of paramount 
importance that the public should see the making and administration of the law at 
work.”256 The public interest in knowing about Parliamentary proceedings overrides 
any individual reputational interests.257 A right of reply may pose a chilling effect on 
reports of Parliamentary proceedings, as reporters may be less inclined to publish 
reports knowing that they may be forced to alter them. For consistency’s sake, and 
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due to the heavy public interest in hearing about the workings of Parliament, it may 
make sense to have an exemption for fair and accurate reports of Parliamentary 
proceedings. The fact that a report must be fair and accurate implies that any potential 
damage to reputations from such reports would be minimal in any case.  
 
There is also a question as to whether there should be a distinction between public and 
private web pages, for example, whether rights of reply should be reserved for 
websites accessible to everyone, or whether they should extend to people’s relatively 
private Facebook pages, where viewership can be concealed from the general public 
and restricted to a smaller number of people. The privacy settings on Facebook are 
variable, a user can set their own privacy preferences, but the default setting leaves a 
person’s profile viewable by the public.258 However, even if one’s Facebook profile is 
kept private and viewable only by Facebook “friends”, readership can be diverse in 
terms of connections with the author.259 There is no determinative definition of what 
sort of relationship warrants a Facebook friendship, and a person’s friends-base can 
range from strong to weak to non-existent ties.260 A person can be Facebook “friends” 
with you, even if you hardly know them at all.261 So while people may feel some 
sense of intimacy within their Facebook community, enough to be encouraged to 
share a wide range of personal information, the reality is that the information may be 
being shared with many people that person would not normally share such 
information with. Moreover, there is nothing to stop your “friends” from 
redistributing that information onto more public forums. It is therefore too hard to 
make a general distinction between public and private pages on the Internet and a 
right of reply should be available on sites such as Facebook where a claimant is 
unable to effectively remedy the damage done to their reputation through their own 
self-administered reply.  
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(d) Time limits 
 
Other jurisdictions place a time limit within which a complaint may be received about 
a publication.262 French law imposes a one-year time limit for complaints,263 while the 
South Korean courts will not impose replies to reports that are more than 6 months 
old.264 Under the French Draft Decree for rights of reply on the Internet, a request for 
the right to reply can be made in writing, acknowledging the manager of the 
respective site, within 3 months from the publication of the article that makes up the 
subject of the request, and the Webmaster must then publish the respective reply on 
the site within 3 days of receipt of the request.265 By limiting the applicability of a 
right of reply, a time limit for complaints would restrict infringements on freedom of 
expression.  
 
However, due to the permanent nature of the Internet, there should not be time limits 
on a right of reply under the new regime. A claimant should not be refused a right of 
reply simply because they have only recently been made aware of damaging blog 
commentary two years after the last comment was made. Those comments could 
remain on the Web forever, and a quick Google search of a person’s name might 
bring them out into the open again. There would constantly be a risk of someone 
finding the commentary, perhaps through a Google search, and reposting it 
somewhere else, thereby further damaging a person’s reputation.  
(e) Consideration of publisher’s original intent 
 
The Commission has proposed that information must simply cause significant 
emotional harm whilst relating to one of the ten enumerated principles in order to 
justify a remedy; the intent of the speaker doesn’t have any bearing as to whether a 
defendant has breached one of the enumerated principles. The Commission has stated 
that it will be a relevant consideration when it comes to generally considering 
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remedies.266 However, South Korean law stipulates that a newspaper’s intent in the 
publication of the false facts will have no relevance in determining whether a right of 
reply is appropriate.267 This paper agrees with the South Korean approach in that a 
publisher’s intent should not be deemed a highly relevant consideration as to whether 
a right of reply should be used. Regardless of the publisher’s intent, a claimant’s 
reputation has been damaged and deserves to have that damage restored.  
2 What form a right of reply should take 
(a) To whom should a right of reply be available? 
 
This paper argues that, if the purpose of a right of reply is to protect reputation, then it 
should only be available to those whose reputation has been affected. The 
Commission has already limited remedies to those who have been significantly 
emotionally distressed by a harmful communication.268 Therefore, a right of reply 
should only be available under the new regime if a digital communication has caused 
significant emotional harm to an individual by damaging that individual’s reputation. 
It should not extend to anyone simply named or affected by a statement, as in 
France.269 The South Korean right of reply is limited to “anyone with a legitimate 
interest” in the publication.270  The approach argued by this paper accords with the 
South Korean approach, in that a right of reply will only be available to those with a 
legitimate interest in protecting their reputation from an emotionally distressing 
statement. 
 
(b) Placement and availability  
 
A right of reply will often only protect reputation if is treated with similar respect to 
the original statement. Placement and context will be important; a small snippet 
buried under a maze of commentary will have less effect than an entire story on the 
subject. In France, if a defamatory article appears on the front page of a newspaper, 
                                                        
266 Law Commission, above n 1, at [5.80]. See also: Cabinet Social Policy Committee, above n 4 at 
[58.1]-[58.9]. 
267 Youm, above n 13, at 1054 
268 Law Commission, above n 1, at [5.66]. 
269 Youm, above n 13, at 1035 
270 At 1054. 
 43 
then the reply should also appear on the front page. The fact that a newspaper might 
have published a claimant’s letter to the editor may not be sufficient.271 Under the 
French Draft Decree regarding rights of reply on the Internet, a reply must be made 
available "under similar conditions as those of the message under discussion and 
presented as a result of exercising the right to reply".272 Consequently, under this new 
regime, a reply should be in the same form as the original statement; it should appear 
in the same place and be the same type of article,273 and the fact that a website may 
allow individuals to comment will not in itself be enough to protect them from a right 
of reply order. A reply should also be made available for as long as the original 
statement is. 274  
(c) Legality of the reply 
 
A reply should be legal. Consequently, the courts should be careful not to allow 
defamatory replies.  Other jurisdictions also stipulate that the reply must be lawful.275 
However, there are few restrictions on the French right of reply; it may also include 
statements of opinion, or value judgments, as opposed to just factual statements.276 A 
reply must simply not be calculated to cause harm to the honour of the editors, but the 
ultimate question is whether the reply is proportionate to the original article.277 This 
paper recommends that the New Zealand courts should accord with this principle and 
proposes that, like the BSA, the courts should be entitled to approve the wording of a 
reply.278 A reply should not be calculated to cause harm and its primary purpose 
should be to vindicate a claimant’s reputation. South Korean law also states that a 
reply should not clearly contradict facts.279 The New Zealand courts should also be 
careful to not issue untrue replies, as such replies run the risk of being defamatory in 
themselves, thereby making them illegal, although it may be difficult to clearly 
determine whether a reply is true or not.  
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(d) Cost to claimant 
 
Whether a claimant should have to pay to have a reply published by a defendant 
should not be an issue in the context of the New Zealand regime. As discussed above, 
a reply should be identical to the original statement in both form and placement, and 
this regime only applies to harmful digital communications. All replies should 
therefore be published online, in which case there should be little or no cost involved 
at all. Nonetheless, the approaches in Germany and France both suggest that a right of 
reply should be free to the claimant,280 and the Social Policy Committee did not 
envisage the Court would be able to make an order for costs,281 so it would seem that 
if cost of publication is an issue, it is to be borne by the defendant. 
3 Summary of when and how a right of reply should be used 
 
A right of reply should be limited to those who have suffered significant emotional 
harm from a statement of fact or opinion that has harmed their reputation, by 
preventing them from being fairly judged as a person deserving of equal respect and 
dignity. A right of reply should be available in commercial contexts and should apply 
to websites that are considered “private”, as well as those that are clearly in the public 
domain. The only exemption should be for fair and accurate reports of Parliamentary 
proceedings. Whether or not a defendant intended to harm the claimant’s reputation 
should not be a relevant consideration, and there should be no time limits on when a 
claimant can ask for a reply. A reply should take the same form as an original 
statement, be found in the same place, and left available for as long as the original 
statement is available. The content of the reply should be legal and approved by the 
Court, and any costs are to be borne by the defendant.  
4 Other available remedies 
 
A right of reply helps to protect a claimant’s reputation by allowing them to put forth 
their side of the story in response to statements that harm their reputation in order to 
provide context or a balanced perspective. This section considers whether other 
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remedies under the proposed regime protect reputation just as well as a right of reply 
whilst posing less of an infringement on freedom of expression.  
 
An order to cease conduct, or encouragement to engage in similar conduct,282 will 
typically not be beneficial if harmful statements are left published. Similarly, a 
declaration that a principle has been breached will not be useful,283 as a harmful 
statement will be left published. Moreover, an order for the release of a person’s 
identity or name suppression will not be directly useful in response to a reputationally 
damaging statement published online.284 This paper considers that, like a right of 
reply, a takedown, apology or correction could be beneficial to a claimant’s reputation 
by forcing the publisher to revoke the original statement.285 However, because a take 
down, apology or correction all require a defendant to fully remove an offensive 
statement, they completely restrict freedom of speech, whereas a right of reply leaves 
room to allow a defendant to leave his offensive statement in the open. The German 
courts consider a right of reply to be less imposing on free speech than a retraction or 
correction, because retractions and corrections have more of a direct effect on the 
original article, by either amending it or censoring it.286 If the Court is entitled to 
review the content of a reply to ensure it is not damaging in itself, it will not 
constitute more of a limitation on freedom of expression than a correction. Indeed, 
since a correction censors the defendant’s speech, in most cases a reply may 
constitute less of an imposition on free expression.  
 
The Broadcasting Standards Authority has noted that an apology will only be ordered 
in rare and exceptional circumstances, but makes a distinction between an order to 
publish an apology and an order to publish a general statement summarising the 
BSA’s decision;287 a general statement is considered less serious. An apology seems 
more like forced speech than a reply does because, with a reply, a defendant can make 
it clear that he does not personally endorse the reply without undermining it, whereas 
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he cannot do that with an apology. An apology requires admission of wrongdoing.288 
An apology therefore contravenes the self-fulfilment rationale more than a reply 
might. The other remedies under the new regime that could be used to protect 
reputation therefore potentially infringe freedom of expression more than a right of 
reply does. 
 
However, it is important to note that there may be cases where an individual has the 
resources to post their own reply in response to a damaging statement that will have 
just as much effect on their reputation as a Court-ordered right of reply. The 
Commission has suggested that a claimant will only be granted redress if self-
regulatory systems and tools on the Internet have been ineffective in redressing any 
harm caused by an original statement.289 So, for example, if the statement complained 
about was a comment on a news page, a comment submitted by the claimant may be 
all that is necessary to remedy the harm done. In such cases, a Court-ordered right of 
reply may be more than is reasonably necessary to achieve its purpose of protecting a 
claimant’s reputation. Moreover, a right of reply may not be as sufficient as a 
takedown in some circumstances, for example, where a damaging picture has been 
issued, a reply may not measure up to the harm caused by the photos. It will be 
important for the courts to consider how much each remedy protects reputation in 
each circumstance and balance that against the harms caused. 
5 Conclusion on minimal impairment 
 
If a right of reply conforms to the model prescribed in this section, it will infringe 
freedom of expression less than the other remedies provided under the new regime 
that could protect reputation, namely a takedown order, apology, or correction. This 
makes a right of reply a means of protecting reputation that impinges on freedom of 
expression no more than is reasonably necessary, thereby satisfying this limb of the 
Hansen test, so long as a right of reply will actually protect reputation in the particular 
case being considered, and a self-administered reply would be ineffective.  
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ii) Is the Limit in Due Proportion to the Importance of the Objective?  
 
This last limb of the balancing test considers a general question of proportionality and 
whether the objective benefits society in ways that outweigh the harm done to an 
individual right or freedom.290 A Court should weigh up the benefits of a right of 
reply against the harms it might cause to free speech and consider which is more 
within the general public interest.291 The Court should give consideration to the value 
of speech involved, by considering the free speech rationales that are implicated by 
that speech; the more valuable the speech, the more justification needed for impinging 
on it.292 More value should be given to political speech and speech in the public 
interest.293 
1 How a right of reply advances freedom of expression rationales  
 
Unlike a takedown, correction, or censoring of speech, right of reply does not pose an 
absolute limit on freedom of expression rationales, because it does not restrict or 
remove the original statement. In some circumstances, a right of reply can actually 
advance listeners’, and thus the public’s, interests free speech interests.  
 
There is some debate as to whether unbridled discourse actually leads to the discovery 
of truth.294 It is naïve to assume everyone enjoys equal access to the marketplace of 
ideas. For whatever reason, some views are widely circulated by the media, while 
others are largely ignored.295 Arguably, some restrictions may be needed to prevent 
false propositions from driving out truths.296  A right of reply could help protect these 
imbalances and advance the marketplace of truth. Consider an instance where a 
prominent blogger is perpetuating a false story about an individual. A right of reply 
could counter this story with an equally accessible and featured response, contributing 
more information to the marketplace and dealing with the issue of unequal access to 
the marketplace. On the other hand, where a claimant has their own platform from 
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which to air their side of the story, and that platform is of equal prominence to the 
platform for the damaging material, then there will be less justification for a Court-
ordered right of reply from a marketplace perspective. For example, if a damaging 
statement is made on Facebook, a claimant will often have the option of replying to 
the statement directly or on his own Facebook page, and a Court-ordered right of 
reply may therefore be unnecessary.  
 
A right of reply allows both the defendant and the claimant to fulfil themselves 
through expression, and has the potential to treat both sides with equal respect and 
dignity, which accords with the self-fulfilment rationale of free speech. An argument 
for the restriction of speech under the self-fulfilment rationale is that the government 
must protect its citizens from harm; not all citizens act in a rational and autonomous 
manner and some ideas can lead irrational people to act in harmful ways.297 Moreover, 
rational autonomous beings are capable of acting immorally and selfishly in the face 
of all available information.298 A right of reply may not fully guard against irrational 
actors, or rational actors who choose to act in a harmful way, but it may prevent some 
irrational action by presenting another side to the story and providing context. For 
example, consider a situation where a person’s angry ex-boyfriend publicised details 
about her HIV-positive status on his blog, a fact she had been keeping secret from her 
friends and family due to shame and uncertainty has to her prognosis. HIV and AIDS 
are stigmatised conditions associated with promiscuity and unsafe and depraved 
sexual habits.299 A reader might take that information, plus the fact that she had been 
keeping her diagnosis a secret, and harshly judge her as a bad or immoral person. The 
discovery of those bare facts by a prospective employer conducting a standard Google 
search on her as a prospective employee might persuade them not to hire her. 
However, if the courts were to allow the claimant to explain why she kept her 
diagnosis a secret (maybe she was worried a lot of her friends would abandon her), a 
reader might judge her less harshly. 
 
As discussed above, the argument from democracy embodies both the marketplace 
and self-fulfilment rationales of free speech; so one could also argue that by 
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advancing those rationales, a right of reply also advances the rationale of participation 
in democracy by fostering the development of ideal democratic participants.  
2 The value of speech  
 
The more a statement fits within the rationales that underlie free speech, the more 
value it has, and the more protection it deserves in the face of limitation.300 However, 
the rationales do not attract equal weight. Tipping J has argued that the rationales of 
democracy and truth are the more important values of free speech, whilst self-
fulfilment may be easier to trade off in favour of another right,301 and the United 
States Supreme Court has identified the importance of protecting the right to criticise 
the government as the central meaning of free speech.302 This paper agrees that 
political speech should be given the most weight. 
 
Nothing in the theory of self-fulfilment or the search for truth explains why freedom 
of expression is more valuable than other values affecting dignity.303 Thus, the 
outcome of any balancing exercise concerning an expression’s contribution to self-
fulfilment or the marketplace of ideas might rest on the potential harm of that 
expression as well as its objective value to the public interest. For example, there is 
more value in knowing the truth about a political figure than there is about the 
average ordinary person.304 The public will also be more interested in verifiable 
information, because there is little interest in blatantly false speech, especially where 
it is misleading.  
 
There is even debate about whether truth can be objectively measured.305 Mill’s 
theory seems to define truth as that which is the product of open debate; free speech is 
justified because its process leads to knowledge, but knowledge is defined by that 
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very process.306 There is nothing in Mill’s theory to suggest an inherent characteristic 
of “truth” that would be universally recognisable by the general public.307 Certainly, 
there are many historical examples where falsity has prevailed, though one could 
argue that in many cases truth has won out in the end, albeit after a long period of 
time.308 Nonetheless, allowing the free expression of contrary ideas may be the only 
way to challenge and modify erroneous beliefs, even if it fails to do so all of the 
time.309 
 
The argument from democracy not only embodies the other two rationales for free 
speech, positing that they contribute to the development of ideal democratic 
participants, but also conceptualises free speech as a check on government power.310 
This makes it a more persuasive argument for protecting speech, and political speech 
clearly falls within this objective. Therefore, political speech should be considered the 
most valuable speech. Value will then be given according to how well speech falls 
within the rationales, so speech that is only considered self-fulfilling will be 
considered less valuable in comparison to speech that also contributes to the 
marketplace of ideas. The public interest in the speech, according to how they fit into 
these rationales, will also be an important consideration. The public interest in 
protecting the type of speech in a particular case will then be weighed up against the 
public interest in the benefits a right of reply might provide claimants’ reputations. 
3 Applying the proportionality limb 
 
Whether or not the benefits of a right of reply are overall proportional to the limits 
imposed on free speech will depend on the nature of the speech in question. For 
example, where an original statement is an opinion piece about a politician’s stance 
on a government’s recent policy decision, the value of that statement will be quite 
high in accordance with the implicated rationales of free speech. An opinion invokes 
the self-fulfilment rationale more than a statement of fact, and political opinions 
contribute to the marketplace of ideas in order to come to the “truth” about political 
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policies and philosophies. The ability to develop and air political opinions helps 
mould individuals into ideal democratic participants and helps to act as a check on the 
government. Any obligation to publish a reply to such a statement might harm an 
individual’s sense of autonomy and could promote bias, and come across as 
governmental regulation, of the marketplace of ideas. This would undermine the 
effect of the original statement as a check on government power. Moreover, 
regulation could also lead to the chilling of similar statements in the future, stifling 
the marketplace. By inhibiting self-fulfilment and stifling the marketplace of political 
ideas and opinions, a right of reply could also inhibit personal political development, 
leading to fewer consummate democratic participants within society. The harm 
caused to a politician’s reputation may be minimal. Indeed, the opinion’s effect on the 
marketplace of ideas may be to surface the truth about the politician, which would 
weigh heavily in the public interest. In such cases, the public might be more interested 
in protecting this sort of speech than the individual reputation of a political official. 
Moreover, a political official may have his own medium through which to air his 
reply, making a Court-ordered reply unnecessary. A Court might therefore consider a 
right of reply to be a disproportionate remedy in light of the harms it might impose on 
free expression.  
 
Whereas, a false statement about a person’s masochistic sex life may be considered 
low value speech,311 because it doesn’t fit well within any of the free speech 
rationales, and would severely harm a claimant’s reputation by preventing them from 
being fairly judged and included within society as a person deserving of human 
dignity. In such circumstances, the limit of a right of reply on the defendant’s free 
speech will be justified, because the interests in protecting the innocent claimant’s 
reputation outweigh the low value speech; the harm caused by the speech is 
disproportionate to its value. 
 
VII Conclusion 
 
The Commission has sought to address the harms of an unregulated Internet by 
providing claimants with a right of reply to harmful digital communications. This 
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paper suggests that a right of reply can suitably redress statements, of fact or opinion, 
which have damaged a claimant’s reputation in an online context, whether or not they 
have been made by a member of the “media”. A test for whether a statement damages 
reputation could be whether it impacts their reputation in such a way that they are 
prevented from being accurately and fairly judged and included within society as 
people deserving of equal respect and human dignity, or makes right-thinking 
members of society think less of them. A right of reply infringes free speech by 
contravening a speaker’s right to self-fulfillment and negatively impacting the search 
for truth and the functioning of democracy for both speakers and listeners.312 
However, protecting reputation is also an important objective, and a right of reply can 
advance this objective by providing context or correcting statements that negatively 
impact an individual’s reputation. It is therefore necessary to balance the benefits of a 
right of reply against the harms it may cause to free speech.  
 
A right of reply should not be ordered where a claimant could post a reply of their 
own accord that will have a similar effect on their reputation as a Court-ordered right 
of reply. It should be available in commercial contexts and should apply to websites 
that are considered “private”, as well as those that are clearly in the public domain. 
However, fair and accurate reports of Parliamentary proceedings should be exempt. A 
reply should copy the form and placement of the original statement and be made 
available as long as the original statement is. Whether or not a defendant intended to 
harm the claimant’s reputation should not be a relevant consideration, and there 
should be no time limits on when a claimant can ask for a reply. A reply should be 
legal and Court-approved, and any costs are to be borne by the defendant. If a right of 
reply conforms to this model, the other remedies available for protection of reputation 
under the new regime will infringe free speech just as much, if not more, making a 
right of reply a reasonably necessary impairment on free speech. However, whether or 
not a right of reply is actually proportional to the harms caused to free speech, and 
therefore demonstrably justified, will depend on the nature of the speech used in the 
original statement. The courts must then consider, on a case-by-case basis, whether it 
is more within the public interest to protect a claimant’s reputation or to protect the 
type of speech used in the original harmful digital communication. 
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